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The Cost of Insurgency in South-East Asia

RSVP–Volunteers for Rural Uplift

Bridging the Gap

Overcoming the Problems of Resettling Hill Tribes

South - East Asian

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CONTENTS: PAGE:

The Cost of Insurgency in South-East Asia 5

By Prof. M. van der Kroef, Ph.D

Bridging the Gap 16

By Gary Oughton

Overcoming the Problems of Resettling Hill Tribes 23

By Dr. Krachang Bhanthumnavin

RSVP — Volunteers for Rural Uplift 35

By Ben Javier

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CONTENTS

PAGE

The Cost of Insurgency in South-East Asia

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TODAY, as in years past, guerrilla insurgency with its accompanying patterns of political subversion and terrorism, afflicts the nations of South-East Asia as they continue to strive toward maturation and stability in their national independence. For some of these nations, like the Philippines or Malaysia, the prevailing insurgency is now a "second generation" problem, having its roots in anti-Japanese guerrilla resistance movements of the Second World War, while in others, e.g. Thailand or Laos, the affliction is more recent, though still a decade or so old. In virtually every instance, however, Peking and/or Hanoi act as a fount of ideological inspiration, tactical guidance or source of arms and supplies for the local insurgent groups in the region. Such groups are commonly drawn, along with the usual component of mere bandits and other criminal elements, from dissident ethnic minorities (ranging from the Karens in Burma to the Chinese in Sarawak), landhungry, neglected peasantries, and radicalised students and urban intellectuals.[1]

The internal political dynamics of the insurgent groups may vary considerably, however, though it is probably true that without the continuous presence of some foreign trained and usually skilled "agitprop" cadre such grievances as may exist among local racial minorities, peasants, and youths would not likely reach insurgency proportions of any significance. In the "second generation" insurgency countries of the South-East Asian region this is particularly the case, as the insurgency itself and its operational groups become "institutionalized", so to speak, interacting (as, e.g., the Huk* organisations in the Philippines) with other legitimate government institutions and political processes, continously drawing fresh recruits from the segment of malcontents to be found in any society, as other adherents, meanwhile, eventually drift away into other and sometimes more legitimate pursuits.

Thus dissidence and insurgency may continue to exist, in part, as in the case of the Huks, "because of a self perpetuating organisation", which knows how to use the instruments of coercion, terror and generalized brigandage to achieve its ends, rather than because of any strong prevailing social unrest.[2] Domestic unrest must also be considered a relatively negligible factor, at least initially, in the case of the insurgency in Laos, which is best seen as a dimension of Hanoi's policies to unify all of Indo-China under its hegemony. Elsewhere, however, e.g. in upland Burma, the prior unrest is genuine enough, and like the "anti-establishment" inclinations of high school and university students, whether in Bangkok, Djakarta, Manila or Singapore (until recently) or anywhere else, requires closely focused politicisation and careful target selection by the insurgent cadre. The weaknesses of public administrative services — especially communi-

*In this article, the author uses the term "Huk" to represent all Communist insurgent groups in the Philippines. Since the later part of 1968 the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP or PKP) has been split into two factions, the traditional faction adhering to Soviet ideoogy and a new Peking-oriented faction called PKP (Maoist). The armed group of the Maoist faction is the New Peoples Army (NPA), that of the traditional faction was renamed "Army Ng Bayan" (Army of the Nation) while the original Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB) degenerated into a partyless armed group with no distinct ideology.

cation — in South-east Asia, as much as the distrust of central government authority and persistent (because necessary) reliance on kin or ethnic "in" group support, all greatly facilitate the radicaliser's or insurgent cadre's work, so that even with a small nucleus of committed followers, preferably operating in difficult terrain, the cadre's impact on the fragile web of local government and society can be extremely destructive.

For all that it has become nearly endemic as a problem of decades, if not generations, in so much of South-east Asia, it is remarkable that insurgency has so rarely been considered in terms of its cost, measured not only in the grim statistics of lives destroyed or maimed, and of precious national reconstruction funds diverted, but also in terms of its effect on local social and development needs, on national political cultures, and on the South-East Asian region's international relations and on the security concerns of its member countries.

Yet, it is precisely in terms of such effects that "institutionalised" insurgency should be understood. One example may perhaps be cited, drawn from Thailand's current educational scene. Early in July, 1972, Thai officials announced that an additional 6,000 students at various teachers' training colleges would be enrolled in order to meet the country's teacher shortage problems. More teacher training institutions would also be set up during Thailand's Third Five Year Plan.[3] Virtually at the same time, however, one could read in the Thai press that in the critical Nakae district of Thailand's Nakhon Phanom province at least three schools have had to be closed because the teachers in them had to flee due to continuous harassment by Communist insurgents and terrorists. Schools in a number of other areas, according to the same report, also were forced to close because local guerrillas threatened the lives of the teachers. In view of these conditions the Thai Army is about to take over the besieged schools. Short and long-term educational training courses are to be established by the Army, to be attended by sergeants, who will take over as teachers in the besieged schools upon completion of their teacher training.

Taking these two reports side by side, and considering them in the light of the fact that the insurgency in Thailand now appears to be intensifying and is covering a widening area,[5] one might venture to suggest that any planned solutions to Thailand's teacher shortage may have to be increasingly linked in future to military training and protection. Indeed, one might ask if the shortage of Thai teachers is not caused in part by standard terrorist practice, evident in South-east Asian insurgencies elsewhere, of making teachers and any other public official the particular target of harassment and worse. What over the years has thus been the "educational cost" of insurgency?

The other side of the coin is the effect of the schooling provided by insurgent movements themselves. Virtually all "people's liberation movements" in South-east Asia, especially those in Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia, have claimed that in areas under their control education is at once taken in hand. The nature and result of the schooling thus provided have been little analyzed. Yet, especially in the "second generation" insurgent countries, these results can hardly be ignored by now. The present author has been informed by Philippine Armed Forces intelligence sources that among some of the younger lower echelon leaders of the Maoist "New People's Army" in the Bicol area of Luzon today are, in fact, "second generation" Huks who were trained at onetime Huk "schools", then operating in Pampanga province. From what is known of these Huk schools, military training is closely blended with meticulous ideological indoctrination.[6] What, then, has been the size and quality of the insurgent cadre thus created?

Yet, insurgent or, for that matter, military intelligence claims that formation of an "alternate" or "counter" government by an active guerrilla force, operating in a given area, has in fact occurred, often tends to be unduly deprecated by others. In September, 1971, for example, a special committee of the Philippine Senate which had studied the insurgency in Central Luzon, reported that many captured Huks did not, during interrogation, refer to the existence of an "alternative system of government" functioning in Huk areas. One might perhaps suggest that rather than querying the Huks about this matter their victims should have been asked. For the existence of a Huk "counter state" or "alternative government" with its own "law" and "order" in parts of Central Luzon has been too well documented, (e.g.

by the report of Senator Manuel Manahan in May, 1967) to be ignored.[8] In any case, the issue is the existence of a system of "schooling" in insurgency areas as part of a covert "counter government" and its deleterious effects on the whole national development effort in South-east Asia which so critically depends on education.

Of course, the cost of insurgency in terms of lost human resource potential can and should be measured even more directly. The most obvious index is provided by the number killed at the hands of terrorists. No compilation for the region as a whole is available, but scattered data are suggestive. Victims of the Communist insurgents during the Malayan "Emergency" (1948-60) alone number at least 5,000. One authoritative estimate of Huk depredations in the Philippines puts the number of those liquidated by the Huks in the period 1965-70 at 273 persons, mainly government officials, recalcitrant landlords and peasants, and including Huks who ran afoul of their own organisations; an additional 200 persons or so were the targets of various Huk atrocities.[9] But this estimate is almost certainly far too low, since many Huk acts of terror and brutality (like instances of Communist guerrilla depredations along the Thai-Malaysian border) remain unreported. According to a Philippine Senate report on the Huk reign of terror in Central Luzon, released May 13, 1969, there were 222 unsolved killings between 1966 and 1968 alone, with probably additional hundreds not brought to the attention of the authorities. Since 1970, according to calculations by the author, at least 150 additional deaths must be blamed on Philippine insurgents, including the Maoist "New People's Army", (NPA), formally established on March 29, 1969.

Huk killings, it might be noted, have often been marked by incredible brutality, with Huk triggermen pumping bullets into the bodies of victims long after they are dead. Philippine intelligence officers have indicated that such brutality is designed as much to make certain of the victim's death and silence as it is to instill terror in the population.[10] Often the job of liquidation has been given by the Huks to known criminals and "contract" killers for hire. The advent of the NPA has brought new dimensions to the old problem of terrorism in the Philippines, such as the assassination in June, 1970, of seven barrio leaders in Tarlac who were returning from a conference to formalise organisation of Barrio Self Defense Units (BSDU) designed to counter the NPA insurgents. The seven victims, according to Tarlac Municipal mayor Lino David, had pledged strong support for his "open war" against the NPA, and they were soon followed in death by other BSDU organisers.

This aspect of the "human cost" of insurgency has, however, yet another side that cannot be ignored. And that is that terror usually begets an equally dreadful counter-terror. Thus one reaction (and, one hastens to add, an atypical one) to the Huk extortionist terrorist "Beatles" gang were the Philippine Government-sponsored Civilian Commando Units (CCU) and Paramilitary Units (PMU), some elements of which, like the feared "Monkees", soon became controversial, leading even prominent Filipinos to question the legality of their existence and their methods. (The Philippine Government has dissociated itself from the "Monkees"). The danger of government overreaction increases in proportion to the threat of Communist subversion. Perhaps the most disquieting example of this in recent South-east Asian history has been Indonesia. Here the coup attempt of September 30, 1965, by leaders and front groups of the Indonesian Communist party in league with dissident Army and Airforce personnel, produced during the subsequent anti-Communist reaction the slaughter of tens of thousands and the imprisonment of thousands more, many of whom have yet to have their guilt established. Charges made by spokesmen for the **Lembaga Pembela Hak-Hak Azasi Manusia** (Institute for the Defense of Human Rights) in Indonesia, that coup prisoners have been tortured and otherwise maltreated by Indonesian military, have deepened the controversy.[11] To note this is not to obscure the torture death of several Indonesian generals at the hands of Communist coup participants, or the evidence of Communist "liquidation lists" containing the names of those to be eliminated if the coup had succeeded.

In both Eastern (Sarawak) and Western Malaysia (along the Thai border) the Malaysian Government has from time to time resorted to the resettlement of entire village communities in new, closely controlled areas. Denying the insurgents access to potential or actual supporters in the suspected communities has been given as justification for the resettlement. In cannot be gainsaid that such resettlement moves have, in

some respects, been effective in drying up sources of protection and food for the guerillas. But it is also true, as Sarawak Chinese in particular have pointed out, that forced resettlement en masse, and quasi-protective custodial procedures, do little to endear the government to villagers among whom the insurgents are presumably seeking to swim like fish in water, as the Maoist adage has it.

In 1963 the majority of Sarawak Chinese (today comprising some 40 per cent of the area's total population of 850,000) had little liking for the idea of joining the new Malaysian Federation. Most of the Chinese preferred a separate independent Sarawak state which they would undoubtedly have dominated. Since then the Sarawak insurgency, now just about a decade old, continues to find adherents and new recruits, especially among younger Sarawak born Chinese, despite ever new military counter insurgency drives, also in collaboration with the Indonesians, and despite increasing implementation of psychological warfare and community development programmes.[12] Granted that much, if perhaps not most, of the persistence of the Sarawak insurgency is due to Peking's inspirational, cadre-and/or material aid to the dissident Chinese youths, mixed with the traditional appeals of Chinese culture now amplified in a highly charged nationalistic context. Without such aid, and with effective dilution of these Sinic appeals, the Sarawak insurgency would doubtlessly have much less significance.

Yet, looking back over a decade of persistent insurgency, the question remains whether present Malaysian and Sarawak Government policies are doing all that could be done to undercut the misdirected aspirations and frustrations of perhaps potentially the most dynamic economic component in Sarawak society, i.e. that of the young Chinese adult. Calculations of the cost of insurgency in South-east Asia can hardly escape such a question. One notes not only the lives lost on both sides in the insurgency's suppression (not to mention financial resources), but also the loss suffered by a developing and nascently modern socio-economy because of the negative involvement of a potentially productive human resource factor The argument that over the years the Sarawak insurgency has enmeshed at the most three or four thousand young Chinese (with a small handful of Dayak allies) and therefore the human resource loss certainly in economic terms has been relatively slight, will not do. For the insurgents have had much sympathy in the Sarawak Chinese community as a whole, as well as in the left wing of the influential Sarawak United People's Party in particular, and these supportive attitudes of that community must also be considered. Was the Sarawak insurgency unavoidable—and is it still unavoidable, after ten years? What could the region's economic progress have been without it? Perhaps we shall never be able to answer such questions.

The human resource problem presented by the Sarawak insurgency has its uncomfortable parallels in other parts of the South-east Asian area. Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines all reflect identical liabilities in this respect. Commenting on the operations of insurgents in his province recently, the Governor of Petchaburi, Thailand, was quoted as saying that Thai-born Chinese, armed with modern weapons, were now among the Communist terrorists in the jungle areas of his province. Additionally, Petchaburi authorities have evidence that some students in the Chinese schools of the province are spying for the terrorists.[13] This is not the place to analyze the position of the Chinese minority in Thailand, members of which are often described as well integrated with Thai social and political life. But the report cited above points to a development which can only cause deep concern among students familiar with the social roots of insurgency in Malaysia.

In Indonesia related developments are now met with. Since the abortive 1965 Communist coup, principally in Djakarta and parts of Java, in which People's China was deeply implicated, Indonesian authorities have repeatedly called attention to the persistent assistance being provided by local Chinese to the Indonesian Communist underground. Some of these Chinese, in fact, appear to be the paymasters of the insurgents. Not least because of this, and particularly during 1966 and 1967, relations between the Djakarta government and members of the three million Indonesian Chinese community were very bad. Subsequently tensions eased somewhat with the implementation of new measures at integrating the Chinese into Suharto's **orba (orde baru**–"new order") and regulating their citizenship. But in mid-April, 1972, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik, in an evaluation of his country's strained diplomatic relations with the

government of People's China, remarked that Indonesia could not be in a hurry to normalise those relations because of the position of the Chinese minority in Indonesia. If the Chinese in Indonesia were to undertake "new moves in opposing the government" Indonesia could not accelerate normalisation of relations with the Peking government, Malik said.[14] This was the first time that the question of the loyalty of the Indonesian Chinese had come up since the dark days of 1966-67, and it was followed, a few months later, by a related warning issued by the official Indonesian **Antara** news agency. **Antara** said in early July, 1972, that the presence of the Chinese minority in Indonesia could create problems because of potential Communist subversive elements among them, and quoting a senior member of the Attorney General's office, **Antara** added that the Indonesian government had not been able to solve what was termed "the complex Chinese problem"[15] Whatever their justification, it is remarks such as these, in effect characterizing the Chinese minority as a whole, which aid in keeping alive the interracial resentments and suspicions that in turn assist in forming the seedbed of subversion, especially among the younger Chinese.

In the Philippines, Chinese Communist assistance to the Huks, and today to the Maoist "New People's Army", has been widely reported, and China's influence among younger radicalized Filipinos, not just a few of Chinese extraction, equally is an established fact. This, undoubtedly, contributes to the same atmosphere of mutual suspicion and resentment, interacting with charges of sharp Chinese business practices and extortion by and bribery of Philippine officials, that is so distinctive a feature also of the Overseas Chinese position elsewhere in South-east Asia.

The point is that the alienation of a sizeable segment of the Overseas Chinese community throughout the region is inseparable from the problem of insurgency, just as both cannot be divorced from the aggressively expansionist policies and subversive infiltration practiced by People's China. Today, counter-insurgency agencies in South-east Asia properly call attention to Peking's hand in the guerrilla movements outside Chinese borders and similarly focus on various aspects of community development in the insurgency afflicted areas themselves. But unless means are also found to integrate the dissident minorities (not just Chinese, but also such diverse groups as the Burmese Karens or the Meo tribes) into the new national political cultures of the region, the cost of insurgency in whatever terms one cares to measure it will not appreciably diminish and guerrilla depredations will drag on and on, as, indeed, they are doing now, from upland Burma to Luzon and Sarawak.[16]

It is at this point that the cost of insurgency to national political systems in South-east Asia perhaps comes most clearly to the fore. Rightly or wrongly, the nation states of South-east Asia have decided to adopt essentially Western parliamentary principles of representative government and, however modified these may have become through the years by local political exigencies, the desirability of adhering to these principles is among the few generally accepted features of the developing national political cultures of the region. It is remarkable how often when modifications are proposed in existing South-east Asian constitutional arrangements (excluding, of course, the arrangements of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" or of "people's democracy" which Hanoi and its allies have in mind for their neighbours) because of a felt political crisis, these modifications are apt to be drawn not from some pre-Western or pre-colonial indigenous political tradition but, again, from the sources of Western parliamentary experience.

Thus a principal criticism of the current political process in Singapore, heard even among Singaporeans, is that there is no effective parliamentary opposition to the Lee Kuan Yew government, and among the most important, if controversial, decisions of the Constitutional Convention now meeting in the Philippines was its decision, early in July, 1972, to change the political establishment of the country from a U.S.-style Presidential system to a European-style parliamentary system, presumably with ministerial responsibility. The repudiation of Sukarno's authoritarian "guided democracy" in Indonesia, which he originally propagated in the later 1950s as being so much closer to the "soul" of the Indonesian people than "free fight" democracy, only confirms the above contention. For commitment to parliamentary government goes to the roots of the Indonesian revolutionary experience, and since the coup of 1965 and Sukarno's fall the popular pressure to restore

parliament and the Indonesian party system to their earlier prominence has been a major factor not only in limiting the authority of President Suharto, but also in the holding, in mid-1971, of general elections—Indonesia's first in 16 years.[17]

Even when parliamentary liberties are declared to be in abeyance, the suspending authority prefers to appeal not to some pre-colonial or non-Western tradition for legitimacy, but as in the case of the Thieu government in South Vietnam, rather emphasizes the act of suspension to be a temporary emergency, even seeking retroactive parliamentary approval. The criticism (particularly insofar as it comes from the non-Communist Left in South-east Asia) of existing political establishments in the region needs to be properly understood: what is attacked are the functioning inadequacies of, or the particular personalities associated with, the prevailing system, not the principles of the parliamentary arrangement itself. Conversations with DAP (Democratic Action Party) and other opposition leaders of the democratic left in Malaysia strongly persuaded the present writer of this. A recent analysis of political discontent among Filipino students found significant majorities favouring democracy as the best form of government, as well as preference for a multi-party over a one party state, even though the same students expressed (1) a relatively strong sense of being unable to influence effectively the course of Philippine politics, and (2) considerable dissatisfaction with the manner elected officials were conducting government affairs.[18] There is little doubt that the full panoply of modern, Western-style, multi-party, parliamentary government, with its essentially adversary relationship between government and an opposition carefully protected in its rights (again, of course, excepting the Communist areas) is a principal, if not the predominant, ideal in virtually all segments of the South-east Asian bodies politic, however this ideal may have been modified by appeals to current conditions of crisis or to indigenous traditions and practices.

But if this is, in fact, the ideal, then it must be stressed that not the least of the costs of insurgency in the region is that almost everywhere political growth toward that ideal has been stunted by the effects of protracted guerrilla rebellion and subversion. The stunting process takes different forms but its manifestations are unmistakable throughout. Sometimes (one particularly has in mind the Philippines, but this aspect of the problem is also met with elsewhere in the region) the issue of subversion and the nature of the insurgency become a political football, with opposing parties either unduly enlarging or dangerously minimising the threats posed by subversion cum insurgency. Such is particularly the case in the "second generation" insurgency countries where prevailing unrest, as has already been indicated, has almost become politically institutionalised. Under these conditions the temptation to brand political opponents as being in league with the insurgents frequently becomes as irresistible as the charge, heard from the other side, that the government is unduly perpetuating a "Red scare" in order to solidify its powers or to win funds for the armed forces or police. (One must recall at this point the derisive term "Budget Huks", used by those who oppose budgetary increases for the Philippine Constabulary at the time of Congressional hearings, when Constabulary spokesmen seek to justify such increases by pointing to the Huk danger.)

A corollary problem is that of the position of the parliamentary and/or partisan Left, even if (indeed, particularly when) non-Communist. This is not the place to inquire into the reasons for the problems confronting avowedly Socialist parties and movements in South-east Asia. One suspects the problem is partly one of relative success: "Socialism", at least in theory, seems to be accepted everywhere as part of the new national political culture. For example, during a recent panel discussion on "national ideology", held in the presence of H. M. the King of Thailand, at Thammasat University in Bangkok, panelists drawn from the military, academic, and publishing fields in Thailand reportedly all agreed with one speaker that Socialism was a necessity for national unity and "the only possible remedy for our present economic ills", although some panel members also stressed the importance of Buddhist teachings.[19] Yet Socialist parties themselves, such as the DAP in Malaysia, are frequently suspect. There is sometimes good ground for such suspicion, to be sure. The "reestablished" Socialist Party of the Philippines, revived in 1967, has been a Communist front since its inception and is presently largely oriented upon the Moscow-leaning, underground **Partido Komunista Ng Philipinas—**

PKP (not to be confused with the Maoist Philippine Communist Party). In Indonesia the Socialist Party dissolved itself in 1960, when Sukarno threatened it with dissolution, because some of its leaders had participated in a recent Sumatran regional rebellion.

The present writer holds no particular brief for Socialist parties or even the democratic Left. The point made here, however, is that a parliamentary system, in which the non-or anti-Communist Left finds itself under such continuous government mistrust as is frequently the case in South-east Asia, must operate under a particularly severe handicap in confronting the totalitarian threats to that system—from the right as well as the left. For it is, in effect, compelled to surrender to the Communists the standard of the Left (even if, and, indeed, particularly when, underground) and with it one obviously important dimension of parliamentary political opinion and action. This in turn permits the Communists to characterize the government as right reactionary, "Fascist" or worse, and dangerously polarises all political life and public discussion of even relatively minor matters in "Communist" versus "anti-Communist" terms. It is this polarisation precisely which the existence of an insurgency helps to aggravate and which so gravely distorts growth toward a stable parliamentary system. Worse, the insurgency itself grows further, or at least holds its own year after year, by the very polarisation of all political action which the insurgency's initial appearance created as reaction in the circles of its opponents. South-east Asian regimes, confronted by insurgency, need to reflect on the adage, attributed to Hitler, that totalitarianism will sooner or later force its opponents into employing its same methods.

The polarisation referred to can, moreover, acquire alarming generational or racial dimensions as well. In the Philippines apprehension over the insurgency problem posed by the Maoist "New People's Army" today is closely paralleled by concern over the Maoist sympathies of radical Filipino youth who openly proclaim their adhesion to the NPA and who by their violent riots in Manila suggest the existence of an "urban guerrilla" counterpart to the more "rural" insurgency of the NPA. One quickly gets the impression in conversation with various law enforcement personnel in the Philippines that the "new" insurgency problem occasionally seems to be viewed in generational terms, specifically as a conflict, if not war, of wise elders against aberrant militant youth. The danger of an insurgency capturing the public image or imagination of being youthful, left progressive, and aligned against a "reactionary" older establishment needs hardly to be emphasized.

Similarly in Malaysia the insurgency is a major (though, of course, by no means the only one) factor in Malay-Chinese racial animosities. Indeed, the tragic post-election riots of May 13, 1969, in Kuala Lumpur underscore again how much Left-Right political perceptions in Malaysia tend to be held in racial terms, with the Chinese usually identified in Left or even Communist terms.[20] That there may be solid historic justification for such stereotyping is here readily admitted: Communist subversion in Malaysia has been predominantly practiced by Chinese. But no long-term political stability can be achieved by racial identification in political terms, and vice versa: the end of the insurgency problem in Malaysia will not just be measured by the absence of guerrilla depredations but by the viability of an interracial Malaysian Left in the political spectrum and parliamentary life of the country. Speaking at a seminar in Kuala Lumpur in early June, 1972, Malaysia's able Minister of Information, Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, declared that Malaysians are wedded to democracy and that his government "is disdainful towards force as a means of bringing about change". Rather, Shafie said, the government would seek change "by setting up institutions to influence circumstances".[21] A major "institution" that can influence the circumstance of insurgency and subversion, one may perhaps suggest, is a viable and diverse partisan political spectrum functioning inside the parliamentary context. **Pari passu,** this observation applies to other countries in the area, notably Thailand, Indonesia and Burma.

The absence of such a truly diverse and constitutionally protected parliamentary political spectrum, can, in the long run, only give aid to those, not necessarily in the camp of the Communists and their allies alone, who argue that a resort to insurgency is the only means left to bring about a more progressive and democratic political order in the countries of the South-east

Asian region. This argument will commend itself to few who not only appreciate how far along the road to constitutional democracy and material self-betterment most countries in the region have already gone, but who also are well aware, from the bitter record in the rest of the world and especially in the new countries, that an appeal to insurgency to justify the realization of "genuine" democracy is among the most common enticements in the Communist arsenal of blandishments. Still, South-east Asian governments, especially those with a decade or generation long Communist insurgency problem, will ignore the efficacy of such enticements only at their peril.

What, finally, of the future South-east Asian international order, as meanwhile the nagging problem of insurgency persists? Two not necessarily mutually contradictory trends are apparent in the foreign policy interests of the South-east Asian nations today, especially since the middle of 1969 and announcement of President Nixon's "Guam Doctrine". It is not enough to identify the first of these trends as "neutralisation" or "neutralism", although it is commonly so designated, particularly among those appreciative of Malaysian initiatives in this direction. For any successful "neutralisation" of the South-east Asian area, as Malaysian spokesmen themselves have frequently indicated, requires an international political guarantee of it, especially by the major powers. "Neutralisation" thus comes to depend on what might perhaps be called "internationalisation". For the corollary of the international political military guarantee of the region as "neutral" would be an international diplomatic and commercial involvement with as many of the nations of the world as prudently possible so that, in a sense, all acquire a stake in maintaining the new diplomatic status quo of a non-involved South-East Asia and in protecting their trade and other interests in the region. Conversely, no single power or bloc of powers can be made to bear the total responsibility of the region's security.

Malaysia's diplomatic and commercial initiatives with East European countries, which are now being followed, if at a slower pace, by the Philippines; the interest in certain Thai circles in an inevitable future rapprochement with People's China; Singapore's active pursuit of a new international commercial and banking status, as probable successor to Hong Kong; a realisation among knowledgeable Indonesian publicists that despite the current freeze in Sino-Indonesian relations a thaw is unavoidable; cautious interest throughout South-East Asia in seeing Japan assume a more direct diplomatic responsibility for the future of the region in which she is investing so heavily—all these developments point toward an "internationalized neutrality", in which many powers have a mutually recognized **entree** to the region, but in which none is permitted strategic, political or economic domination.[22] The right of **entree**, one hastens to add, must of course, also not override the national self-interest of the South-East Asian nation(s) concerned, lest a new battle cry of "anti-neocolonialism" bring again unwanted tremors of instability.

The second trend, in principle not averse to the first, at least as a long haul proposition, places however primary interest today on the necessity of some kind of a collective security arrangement, particularly one which, in the absence of agreement among the South-East Asian powers themselves on the nature of such an arrangement, must be backed by one or more of the major, or if necessary, by a combination of the "intermediate" powers (e.g. Britain or Australia). The rationale of this second trend is the threat of externally induced insurgency and/or subversion in the South-east Asian region, coming in the first instance from the People's Republic of China and, secondarily, (and at the moment more potentially rather than actually) from a USSR, looming ever larger in diplomatic and strategic terms in the whole area. From this second point of view the possibility of being caught up in a Sino-Soviet "cold war" is not to be dismissed, as meanwhile neither the decelerating "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", nor People's China's admission to the UN, nor again the Nixon initiatives toward Peking, have led to any appreciable lessening of Peking assisted or directed guerrilla unrest among her neighbours. Nor has there been a let-up in vocal Communist Chinese support for, nor in propagandizing of the alleged achievements of anti-government resistance movements in the region. On May 29, 1972, for example, Peking Radio, citing the clandestine **"Voice of Malayan Revolution"**, asserted that "revolutionary mass organisations in Penang, Kelantan, Perak, Selangor and other states raised red flags, distributed propaganda materials and laid mines at various places", announcing further that the

Communist Party of Malaysia was determined to make still greater efforts to launch "people's war" in Western Malaysia.[23] Nor is Peking—presumably so underdeveloped herself—lacking in generosity to those of its Communist neighbours which themselves are bent on aggressive expansion: through 1971, for example, North Vietnam had received more than US$1.36 billion in aid from People's China, the largest single entity in the total US$4.4 billion aid package which the Communist Chinese have been extending to various countries since 1953.[24]

To those, especially in the US and Australia, who in various degrees of verbal sophistication have taken up the slogan "Let's not be beastly to Peking", the recent categorical statement of Thailand's General Prapass, Deputy Chairman of his nation's National Executive Council, in an interview with a leading Singaporean journalist, that Thailand "certainly has substantial evidence to conclude that there has been Communist Chinese involvement in insurrectionist movements in Northern Thailand", simply falls on deaf ears.[25] And yet such Chinese involvement, in some areas like Laos and Cambodia amplifying close North Vietnamese interaction with insurgent movements as well, is a reality which no nation in South-east Asia can afford to ignore in considering the future international order in its region.

There is considerable evidence that even those South-east Asian nations apparently most committed to "neutralisation" realise the necessity of an externally supported military presence, even if only in modestly symbolic terms, to bolster their own defence system. Thus Malaysia rather prefers retention of the ANZUK (Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom) and the Five Power military commitment, as indeed does Singapore, which has been much more sceptical toward the "neutralisation" idea. That "neutralisation" is a long-term hope, rather than a practical and immediate possibility, is also evidenced by the current state of the so-called Kuala Lumpur declaration of the ASEAN powers (Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore) in November, 1971, a declaration which saw the South-east Asian area hence forth as a region of peace, freedom and neutrality. Two of the signatories, i.e. Thailand and the Philippines, remain members of SEATO, and despite suggestions of changes in the SEATO system as suggested by Philippine Foreign Secretary Carlos Romulo at the Canberra meeting last June, there is little likelihood that the Marcos government will shortly disengage itself from the system. As for Thailand, and for that matter Indonesia, there seems to be even greater caution in an implementation of the Kuala Lumpur declaration. During the July, 1972, discussions by ASEAN representatives on such a possible implementation of the neutrality idea, one conference source declared: "We are working now so that in ten years time when the proposal is likely to come to fruition we will understand what we all mean"—this hardly suggests a short time perspective on the realisation of the Kuala Lumpur declaration.[26] The Republic of South Vietnam, which has been proposed by Indonesia as a future ASEAN member, has categorically rejected the possibility of "neutralisation" at this time.[27] While the USA is not a member of ASEAN, Secretary of State William Rogers, when asked to comment recently about the idea of "neutralisation" for the South-east Asian area, declared that America would fully support such idea if it were based on the independence, non-alignment, welfare and security of the countries concerned. But, he added, that he needed first to have "a clearer understanding" of the concept since "neutrality means different things to different people."[28]

All this is not to say that the "neutralisation" of South-east Asia is unlikely ever to be realised, or that it is inherently an undesirable mode of international organisation in the South-east Asian region. After all, even the Soviet Union in the past three years repeatedly floated the notion of a new security system for the whole of Asia based on the region's genuine non-alignment, respect for sovereignty and existing national boundaries, renunciation of force, intraregional cooperation and so on. The fact is, however, that for the time being the neutrality idea remains a casualty of many factors, certainly among them being the insurgency and subversion that victimize the South-east Asian community—indeed, the impossibility of its implementation as a promising diplomatic alternative in a future South-east Asian regional order, makes the concept as much a part of the high cost of insurgency as the continuing loss of lives at the hands of Communist terrorists, or the debilitating racial-political tensions surrounding the position of the area's Chinese minorities. No less than the maturation of

processes of national parliamentary government, the construction of a viable South-east Asian international order awaits the end of the Communist guerrilla threat and its foreign supporters.

Conversely, the policy reorientation of the non-Communist super powers toward South-east Asia is also compelled to mark time, creating new frustrations domestically that abet an unrealistic return to isolationism (as in the US), or uncertainties that cause opinion to vacillate between "all-or-nothing", Left or Right extreme diplomatic alternatives (as in the case of Japan). In some US circles a reorientation of American policy toward South-east Asia has become almost an obsessional neurosis, in which it seems impossible to balance the legitimate and domestically widely felt desire for a reduction of the American political-military commitment to the South-east Asian region, with a realistic grasp of the collective security needs of both South-east Asia and the US that makes room for a continuing American presence. Meanwhile, Japanese defence circles are reported as being prepared to provide economic and diplomatic assistance to any Asian collective security system, but also stress that such a system depends on an "Asian initiative"[29]—an obviously rather broad contingency, so broad, in fact, that under the circumstances it seems but an invitation to perpetuate the status quo. Japanese concern for a new rapprochement with both the Communist and non-Communist major powers is hemmed in too by the unresolved antagonisms in her neighbouring region of South-east Asia, antagonisms of which the insurgency problem remains the touchstone.

In an insurgency condition the guerrilla force that does not lose (if only and simply by persisting), in effect, wins; and the government, if it does not win (clearly and definitively) loses—so an old guerrilla warfare maxim has it. Considering the South-east Asian insurgency problem, and how it continues to drag on and on, the question becomes ever more compelling whether the region can much longer afford its cost.

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16. In this connection it may perhaps be noted that the pull of People's China upon younger Overseas Chinese probably is a good deal less than is sometimes supposed. A careful recent study of Filipino Chinese high school students in Cebu City, the Philippines, showed that less than 12% of the respondents would prefer to live in People's China if money were no problem and they had the choice (as compared to more than 14% for Taiwan, 21.4% for Europe, and 31% for the USA and Canada). Alarmingly, however, only 7.1% preferred to live in the Philippines as their first choice. Robert O. Tilman, "The Chinese of the Philippines: between Scylla and Charybdis", **Solidarity,** (Manila), November, 1970, p. 45.

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18. **Tilman,** "The Chinese of the Philippines," op. cit., pp. 43-44, Compare Averch, et. al., **A Crisis of Ambiguity, op. cit,** pp. 41-52, who note a similar essentially positive attitude of Philippinos toward their government institutions (although, one presumes,, not necessarily toward particular office holders).

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Bridging The Gap

By Garry Oughton

The author, an Australian, is Agricultural Adviser to the Hill Tribes Research Centre in Chiang Mai, Northern Thailand. The centre, which is part of the Department of Public Welfare, under the Thai Ministry of Interior, was set up with SEATO co-operation and formally inaugurated in 1965.

MY work usually keeps me in the northern mountains of Thailand but I am writing this on the verandah of a house in a village in Northeast Thailand, about six kilometres from the new Borabue-Buriram highway constructed recently with New Zealand aid. I have just toured agricultural research and education facilities in the Khon Kaen area and I am travelling with a friend who is married to a girl from this village; it is a unique chance to bridge The Gap and find out how things are under the quiet face of the countryside. I am well justified in spending time here — the problems of both the northern hills and the northeastern plains have a major similarity. To put it crudely: how to **control** the activities of the multiplying country populations before they completely destroy the Kingdom's natural resources and plunge this happy country into abject poverty and misery; or, to put it another way, how to **provide for** the country people in such a way as to ensure them and their descendants a life of adequate health and nutrition with economic opportunity sufficient to afford them some of the advantages of modern-day life; income derived in a fashion ensuring that they conserve the ability of the natural resources to provide in this way for their offspring in perpetuity.

Everything at Khon Kaen was very impressive. It is one of the tidier towns of the northeast region and the monsoon rains, starting late this year, had just washed away the dust. At the Khon Kaen University farm the fields are large and well-fenced, the roads well-maintained, the experimental plots neatly trimmed, the livestock fat, and the buildings clean and freshly painted. It is the same at the North-Eastern Agricultural Centre—spendidly equipped laboratories and offices well-provided with secretarial facilities for the senior Thai staff and the American advisers. And there is a superb irrigation system drawing water from three kilometres away and pumping it to the fields through a sophisticated network of underground pipes and sprinklers and concrete-surfaced ditches. The staff are all busy with research projects; those who are not overseas studying for higher degrees. And at Borabue Land Development Station the most weed-free and well-managed pastures in Northeast Thailand are turning out scores of excellent cattle every year. But they are a little piece of New South Wales or Kentucky or Ruakura, these stations; picked up holus-bolus and relocated in Khon Kaen province, mantling the sandy rises and the swampy hollows with a veneer of technological sophistication that finishes at the boundary fence. Millions of dollars invested already and people are now realising that the hardest and costliest work is yet to come: bridging The Gap and getting the findings of research, the new seeds and livestock and farming systems through to the silent majority—the rural people who have been quietly multiplying and getting shorter and shorter of farmland, largely unaware of the efforts of those on the other side of The Gap—inside the agricultural station boundary fences—to promote agroeconomic uplift.

* * *

This house is the biggest and best in the village, two storeys, with wooden walls and iron roof. Painted too, with little glass panels like eyebrows above the storm shutters. It was built by the youngest daughter of the family of 13 who cashed in on her dark-eyed beauty and went away to Bangkok to become the minor wife

of a Chinese businessman. She is greatly respected in the village for building this fine house under the kapok trees to shelter her parents in their twilight years. Like all the other houses in the village there is no bathroom and no toilet: you take a spade with you and squat among the mulberry bushes in the garden out the back. And there is no well. They dug one last year but had no money to buy concrete lining rings. The sandy sides soon fell in. So the young girls waddle home under the yoke of two buckets of water every evening from the village pond beside the wooden temple 500 metres away. The young girls of this village are lucky—in some other villages they would have to walk two or three kilometres. Of course that would give them better opportunity to be courted by the young men on their way home from the fields; they might offer to carry the buckets too—life is not all sweat and tears!

It is a good waterhole, much better than average, securely fenced against cattle and buffaloes and coolly shaded by two big rain trees. It was dug by hand and is deep enough to retain water all the year; the water is clean and cool, the surface covered by pink and yellow pondweed. It was paid for by another daughter of the same household whose trim figure got her a job in a Bangkok nightclub. She is of course also greatly respected in the village for her thoughtfulness and concern for the welfare of her family and neighbours.

The sons who did not go to work as Bangkok taxi-drivers and the daughters who married early have their homes clustered around the big house like chicks under the wings of mother hen. One is on stilts of sawn timber with an iron roof. The walls are of rough-hewn boards that do not meet at the edges. The timber has been cut from the National Forest between here and the highway. By law, of course, you don't do that. You must ignore the timber growing nearby and ignore the fact that you have spare time all the dry season. You must borrow money from the Chinese trader in the market if you can find a guarantor and pay the prevailing interest rate of 10 per cent per month. Or you must pawn your rice fields to a local merchant and rent them back from him at the cost of half the annual crop. Take your money to the sawmill 20 kilometres away, buy your timber and hire a truck to bring it home along the oxcart track through the National Forest. Cut the timber and cart it yourself and it costs you nothing but your labour, plus the risk of jail if you are caught. Buy the timber from a neighbour who has cut it in the forest and an adequate house will cost you 2,000 to 4,000 baht (between US$100-200). Buy it from the sawmill and it costs you 10,000 baht (about US$500) or more. There is a rumour that may be the sawmiller cut the trees illegally anyway and did not pay his full share of government dues. Don't think about it too much, take a little drink to ease your mind. No money left to buy it? Never mind, it doesn't take long to brew a bucketful of sweet rice wine. Illegal, of course.

Ten years ago the District Forest Office could grant permission to cut building-timber in the National Forest for a small fee. But so much forest has been cleared now for cropping that this policy has been changed. There is no replanting programme in this area. Another house has been built by a newly-married couple. It is on pole stilts, with a split bamboo floor and walls of bundled swamp-grass; very cheap but not very permanent. The thin lalang-grass thatch is already starting to leak. The rain dripping from the eaves puddles the manure from the buffalo stabled underneath and spills out across the village thoroughfare in a smelly green-black stream. This is the first good rain of the season and it has come very late. My friend and I and old grandfather are the only men left in the village this morning. All the rest are out in the rain making up for lost time, preparing and planting the rice fields. A young married woman shambles by, bare feet sloshing through the flowing manure and a sheet of glossy green plastic keeping the rain off her head, a change of clothes in a plastic bag in her hand. The birth-control loop in her womb is giving her trouble so she is walking to the highway to catch a bus to the health centre. No vehicles can reach the village in this rain. The women on the verandah have heard of many instances of trouble with the type of loop in current usage. Is there a better one? I think there is, I have read about an improved one they are using in India but I am not sure. I feel inadequate; anybody working in the field of rural development in Thailand should know **everything** about family-planning technology. Without more effective birth-control programmes all other rural development efforts will be largely wasted—farms will become too small and too fragmented for improved economies to take effect. I will find out. Some of the

women here take the "pill", purchased from the District Health Centre for five baht per month, but there are side-effects and these frighten them. What about the men? What about vasectomy? They have heard about the programme in India; is there one in Thailand? Again I am unsure and ashamed; I will find out.

They know all about the population problem here. Old grandmother is 70 years old and last year most of her children and grandchildren and great-granchildren came back for a religious ceremony. There were 112 of them gathered together! There are 600 people in this village and the 150 or so older children have all walked off through the rain four kilometres to school. In the dry season they have to carry drinking water with them because the school has no well. But the young children left at home are as thick as flies and covered with flies too. Running and shouting and falling in the mud, wailing and clutching at the breast. Always within earshot. Even at night there is sure to be a child crying somewhere in one of the houses nearby.

Twenty years ago this area was thickly jungled; just a few clearings of the quiet nomadic Suay who travelled the Thai-Lao-Cambodia triangle area planting upland rice and communing with the spirits of the forest and taming elephants. Yang-oil trees 40 metres tall here, and swamp-grass; wild elephant, wild pigs, forest chickens, snakes and jungle fowl. It was a bad season in Roi Et province to the north. The rains were poor and the rice had been **"ngarm"** for three years in succession. The people were thick upon the land and thin and hungry. So they crossed the Moon River and pushed south through the forest until they reached the swampland. They built this village above the waterline, slashed and burnt the jungle and planted upland rice and peanuts and vegetables in the ashes. The wet bottom lands were bunded and sown with paddy rice. Crops were good, the news spread and migrants poured in. The clearings grew and grew. Now there is no firewood-forest left within sight of the village. They use the more economical and convenient charcoal instead, prepared in small earth mounds at the edges of the National Forest near the highway. All the bottom lands have been bunded and puddled. There is no room to expand. Since two years ago all job-seekers from this village have had to move away to find a living elsewhere. Landholdings are being split through inheritance and many people have met financial troubles and have pawned their land off to Chinese merchants. It did not happen just here, but along the new road there is bitterness where land on both sides has been taken up by government officials and businessmen—taken over without recompense to those who had cleared the land and were cropping it but had not obtained certificates of leasehold.

When you cannot expand your landholdings you must intensify. Dig the land deeper and more often, use more manures and fertilisers to raise the yields. Grow fast-maturing crops to take full advantage of the scanty rainfall. You cannot raise rice-yields much, even with Green Revolution technology, if you do not have controlled irrigation. And that is out of the question for most of the Northeast. If you can arrest population-growth while farm sizes are still large enough, maybe you can break the paddyfield bunds and grow peanuts and oilseed crops, two or three quick crops per wet-season, sell them, buy rice from the irrigated areas and pocket the difference. But you must have road access and market infrastructure. In this country you can drive anywhere in the dry season. It is rough, but you can get there. But crops harvested in the rainy season must be sent to market in the rainy season. The budget for the North-Eastern Agricultural Centre for the years 1966-1975 inclusive averages well over one million dollars per year. One million dollars a year would have tipped a lot of laterite gravel in a lot of back-country bogholes. It would have made a lot of village feeder-roads passable in all weathers, maybe 2,000 kilometres per year. You do not need much of a track for a modest pickup truck, just keep the bogholes shallow, that's all. There are thousands of trucks and pickups around the country.

But there must be a limit to agricultural intensification. The Forest Department is quite right in reserving National Forest. Cut all the trees off these plains and the overall rainfall will diminish. It is little enough now. And the strong dryseason wind will blow the topsoil off the sandy knolls and leave them useless for cultivation. And, as in India, the people will be reduced to burning cattle dung for cooking fuel, instead of using it to fertilise

crops. A vicious circle. To overcome similar problems in the northern hills we have advocated a policy of allocating a forest plot to each village, under community ownership and control with a continuous fire-protection and replanting programme aimed at enabling the forest plots to provide the villagers' fuel and building-timber needs in perpetuity. Villagers with a vested interest in their communal forest plot will be very effective at detecting and excluding timber poachers! And in the North the Forest Industry Organization has a continuous forest management programme employing land-hungry peasants in reafforestation and timber harvest. Here in the northeastern plains with very gentle slopes, intensive agriculture does not lead to much watershed damage; wind-erosion will be the main risk. Not so in the northern hills where population pressure and land-shortage are just as bad if not worse.

When it rains in Thailand it really pours and you depend on those mountains to soak up the water and keep it from roaring down and flooding out the national rice-bowl downstream. And the dry-season is mercilessly dry. Sometimes six months without a drop of rain. You depend on those mountains to keep the streams flowing with water percolated deep underground during the wet. The mountain catchments will not perform like this unless the bedrock is covered with a good depth of open absorbent topsoil. The soil will not stay on the steep hillsides unless it is protected all year round by vegetation. The soil surface will not remain open and porous unless that vegetation includes sufficient tall trees to break the force of the monsoon raindrops before they impact on the soil surface and seal it over. The presence or absence of tall trees depends on the axes and matches in the hands of people, country people, the under-educated, underemployed, underpriveleged, undernourished, underestimated rural silent majority, 85 per cent of the national population who will proceed, steadily, surely and helplessly to erode away the source of livelihood for themselves and their offspring unless The Gap can be more speedily bridged.

The Gap... planners are well aware of it now, sitting like a skeleton on the shoulder of all development plans, cackling at efforts to shake it off. The technological gap between Thailand and more-developed countries; the import/export gap; the income gap between the rich and the poor; the administration gap between Bangkok and the provinces; the communications gap between government official and citizen, between teacher and pupil; between agricultural scientist and farmer; between Thai counterpart and foreign adviser; the information gap between national planners and the real situation in the backwoods, the gap between the availability of natural resources and the demands of the populace on them. The understanding gap between the official dialect of Bangkok and the Lao-based provincial dialects of the north and the northeast, and the Sino-Tibetan and Tibeto-Burman languages of the mountainous tribal lands. They are all part of The Gap. Close it and there will be progress. Leave it open and everything will fall behind and there will be nowhere to run to.

There is nothing new in what I write. The existence of The Gap has been officially recognised; for example, in the **Bangkok Post** on July 30, 1972, the following extract appeared —

> *The National Executive Council has approved in principle a land reform programme which requires absentee landlords to sell their land to the government in exchange for bonds so that it could be redistributed to landless farmers, Lieutenant-Colonel Narong Kittikachorn, assistant director of National Security, announced yesterday.*

and from the same issue:

> *The Assistant-Director of the National Executive Council's Security Division, Lt. Col. Narong Kittikachorn, Friday night said that the new generation constitutes a major force to shoulder the burden of making a four-point national ideology a success... He pointed out there was a big gap in our society between the rich and the poor. "From the latest census survey, our country's population is 39.2 million. Out of this figure, two million are classified as*

the rich, seven million as middle class, and the rest constitutes the low-income bracket. It is the last group that the Communists have tried to indoctrinate and to make use of them as tools to spread Communism.

According to my knowledge, 34 out of 72 provinces have been infiltrated. If the situation is not corrected promptly the future will be horrible," said Col. Narong.

The Gap has been officially recognised and programmes of land reform, family-planning, vocational education, import substitution, land consolidation, reafforestation, community development are all under way. But are these programmes comprehensive enough? And are they being carried out fast enough? Japan has closed The Gap (perhaps too well) and is now facing the overdevelopment problems of the Western world. Taiwan has done it, in the face of pressures far more extreme than that which has yet confronted Thailand. Newspaper reports indicate that Mainland China is doing it, dragging herself up by her own bootstraps. Peasants are carrying eroded soil by the basketful back up onto the hillsides, but only after losing millions of people in floods and famines, and after the most excruciating internal social ideological and economic reforms. Thailand is on the way too, but the approach will need to be different because the situation is different from those other countries. Japan, Taiwan, and Mainland China have a long history of intense rural population pressure and competition for land. The rural people are automatically competitive and industrious because they have had to be for generations. Not so in Laos, Burma, Cambodia or Thailand. There have been plenty of explosions in Laos recently, but not as yet a population explosion. In Cambodia there is still adequate land for the population. In Burma the lack of medical facilities has kept the population in balance with the resources because of the high rate of infant mortality still prevailing in the remoter areas. Apart from Vietnam, in the South-East Asian Peninsula there is only Thailand which has suddenly swung from a state of luxurious unhurried under-population to the situation prevailing today. And only in the last very few years. The rapid expansion of the highway system accelerated by the substantial foreign aid injected over the past ten years has led to a sudden buildup of small businesses in the rural towns. And the small businessmen are Chinese. The Thai are cultivators by tradition, not business-people. What they lack in economic strength they make up for in social strength. But when you run out of land no amount of social strength can keep your belly full or your children at school. Walk through any large provincial town on Chinese New Year's Day to assess the proportion of Chinese small businessmen. There is hardly an open door.

The small businessmen have learnt their trade from their families since childhood, and wherever possible the children have been sent to good schools to learn calculating, reading and writing Thai, Chinese and English. Then back to the family business and expand it somewhere else as opportunity permits. At a higher level of education are the Kingdom's government officials, bankers, and big businessmen. So many of them, well integrated into Thai urban society as they are, still retain the basic Chinese profit-making attitude to education and to business inherited from their not-so-distant Chinese ancestry. Thus the real Thai people of the rural villages, the custodians of the country's folk-religion and traditions and philosophy have not generally been able to actively participate in the country's administration and management, because of education deprivation as much as anything, and of the lack of an economic orientation in traditional peasant culture.

Social structures and mutual intra-community responsibilities would generally prevent a Thai villager from charging a fellow villager an exorbitant rate of interest. But no such feelings of mutual social responsibility exist in the hearts of the Chinese traders, the much-maligned middlemen. They play the market for what it will stand. Interest rates are killing, but what can you do if your family is more important to you than all the gold in the world and there is a family emergency? And who else will lend money against the security of a weedy little bit of ricefield in the backwoods? The middleman may be despised, but he performs a function no one else does, and if necessary he will take rice or pigs instead of money. But this sort of thing will not lead to self-sustaining rural economic develop-

ment. Therefore the government currently is moving to strengthen rural co-operative societies and agricultural development banks.

So what we face is actually a "colonial" situation—almost a heretical statement for a nation which takes a fierce pride in never having come under the colonial "yoke" and yet has managed to maintain an influential and respected place in the forums of the international community. The citizens and influential persons of Taipei are Chinese and the rural dwellers of Taiwan are Chinese; somewhat diverse in dialects but able to understand the Chinese written script no matter what dialect is spoken. The citizens and influential persons of Tokyo are Japanese and the rural people are Japanese. The citizens and influential persons of Peking are Chinese and the rural people are Chinese and the urban young are sent to work in the countryside as part of their education. But the influential persons of Bangkok are predominately Sino-Thai with a predominantly urban and commercial and industrial orientation and the northern and northeastern provinces are as effectively under the "colonial" rule of Bangkok as Indonesia was a colony of the Dutch, and Malaysia was a colony of the British, and Vietnam was a colony of the French. All roads lead to Bangkok, most processing of raw materials is done in Bangkok, most processed goods are shipped through Bangkok, the best education is available in Bangkok, there are better opportunities for work and promotion in Bangkok, local administration is still Bangkok-oriented and Bangkok is an important crossroads of international traffic and culture. Through a conscientious government programme, the attitude of local administrators toward the rural dwellers is greatly improved compared to the attitude prevailing a few years ago, but the Governors and District Officers are still rotated fairly frequently and regularly. You do not find many locally-born District Officers serving in the North or the Northeast.

Compare this to the British colonial system where Colonial Service officers were encouraged to make a lifelong profession of serving in the remote colonies. They were required to become thoroughly conversant with the way of life of the "natives" and they were not promoted unless they had successfully completed examinations in the local languages. And usually the British left behind them a well-trained and well-oriented locally-staffed civil service that continued to function smoothly into the post-colonia era. Education and health services and public works were effectively administered. The local people were encouraged to build up their landholdings and capital and to become economically independent. By contrast, Indonesia suffered miserably in the early stages of her colonisation through the policy of shipping all the profits home to Holland, leaving nothing for the locals except a miserable daily wage, enough to buy only food and no possible way of accumulating working capital.

Let Bangkok take due note. There is no shame in "colonising" a country or a region or a province if it is done justly and honorably. And when planning the "colonial" development of the countryside, let us follow the trend of today's most enlightened economists and assign an investment value to conservative landuse and to social stability. Let us not just shortsightedly seek cash in-hand only. It is estimated that the maximum foreseeable rate of industrial development in Thailand will only provide employment for 18 per cent of the expected available national labour force. The rural areas must be developed to absorb the remainder, and the individual must be encouraged to accumulate working capital; then he will become a valued customer for the products of urban industrialisation. Give a man a piece of land to call his own, a piece big enough to feed his family and to earn a little bit of cash as well. Something tangible to hand on to his sons. He will be happy; he will get his excitement gambling with the crops and with the seasons and with the market. He will take a responsible place in the rural community, and he will be loyal to the nation.

This is how we aim to keep the topsoil on the northern hillsides, to keep the rivers flowing, to arrest the continued destruction of forest, to curb the growing of opium-poppy, and to keep the highland people loyal to the Royal Thai Government so that they will not be wooed by the Communist insurgents —

By recognising the need of each rural-dweller to accumulate working capital;

By providing low-interest longterm loans when necessary in order to achieve this;

By allocating suitable land under individual useright on condition that intensive and conservative agricultural landuse principles are followed; and

By reafforesting the remainder of the land, offering wage-employment opportunities to the local people in the forestry work.

One of the severest constraints to this work will be the training of development workers and farmers. Current thinking is that this is best achieved most easily and comprehensively through emphasis on rural youth-club activities incorporating communal agricultural projects rather than through more formal educational institutions. Rural radio services can play an important part in rural youth-club activities. Broadcasting is already well developed both in the north and the northeast, with the capacity to provide programmes in several local dialects.

Overcoming the Problems of Resettling Hill Tribes

By Dr. Krachang Bhanthumnavin

The author has a made a close study of the problems of hill tribes resettlement in Thailand. He is Agricultural Adviser to the Hill Tribes Affairs Centre, under Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC), which covers hill tribes affairs in Northern Thailand.

BAN Pa Klang is a new Thai village (population 4,412) about 60 kilometres north of the provincial capital of Nan province in Northern Thailand. The village was established early in 1968 on a site which used to be badly degenerated forest and which was considered by local Thais to be too poor to occupy. To casual visitors Ban Pa Klang is just another Thai village, perhaps rather large but certainly orderly. There are the usual distinctive landmarks of any Thai village — the Buddhist temple, the school, and (a little more unusual this) a recently constructed 180-metre long dam, provided by New Zealand under its SEATO aid scheme to assist Thailand's counter-insurgency effort. There are groups of thatch-roofed houses surrounded by banana plants and other fruit trees set along well-planned roads. There are the usual village shops, a rice mill and the inevitable little groups of children around the households.

But Ban Pa Klang is a village with a difference. It is a hill tribe re-settlement village where for the first time officials have faithfully carried out government policy in treating the tribesmen as full Thai citizens — not curious outsiders from the mountains. The observable objects and activities in the village are the manifestations of a new official philosophy regarding Thailand's hill tribes — the philosophy of "accelerated integration." Ban Pa Klang is also the product of an original experiment in the administration of the hill tribes, namely the policy of "administration through co-ordination." To those well acquainted with the hill tribe problems and development in Thailand, this new philosophy and administrative procedure would signify a profound departure from the old philosophy and practices still being adopted towards the hill tribes by many government and non-government agencies elsewhere in Thailand. But further elaboration is necessary for those less acquainted with the hill tribes situation in Thailand.

REVIEW OF THE PAST AND CURRENT PHILOSOPHY AND POLICY TOWARD HILL TRIBES

The current philosophy regarding hill tribe development originated in the late 1950's during which period the Thai Government had officially expressed its awareness and concern of the social and economic problems posed by the increasing number of hill tribes in the northern border areas of the country. The crux of the philosophy of that period was that the tribesmen were socially and technically primitive people who were a race apart from the lowland Thais and who preferred living in isolation. It was felt that welfare measures were sufficient to keep these tribesmen orderly and happy. (1,2)

Further development and emphasis of this philosophy occurred during the early 1960's during which time the Thai Government was receiving the services of several overseas anthropologists and social anthropologists many of whom, in this author's opinion, were not coming up with the right answers to a really tricky problem. Although many of them recognised the prospect of the hill tribe problems becoming so enlarged that they would be difficult to solve if not tackled speedily, these specialists strongly advocated pursuance of the so-called "open-ended integration" or "non-integration" philosophy. In effect, this meant the maintenance of the **status quo** of the relation between tribal communities and the mainstream of Thai society. (3)

Once again welfare measures were regarded as sufficient to pacify the hill tribes and to assist them in moving towards integration into Thai society. Under such affirmative guidelines thus emerged the government policies and programmes for the welfare and "development" of the hill tribes which are still being followed today.

The creation of the Hill Tribe Welfare Division within the Department of Public Welfare as the sole administrative agency responsible for hill tribes affairs was the natural extension of the "non-integrated" philosophy. The division expanded its area of authority even though such authority often operated in administrative isolation. Thus the development of the hill tribes, which I believe demands a multi-disciplinary and multi-agency approach, was limited from the beginning in its administrative framework. It was unfortunate that no serious criticism was made regarding the validity and/or the appropriateness of this fundamental issue of administration. This, however, was understandable when one considers that in that period of policy formulation there was meagre knowledge of the hill tribes problems and affairs and the Thai officials relied so much on the advice of expatriate specialists who, in all good faith, were not always coming up with the solutions appropriate to the immediate needs of the country.

The government did, however, attempt to achieve some degree of co-ordinated multi-agency operation by setting up in 1965, the National Hill Tribes Committee with its five sub-committees. The committee has not lived up to expectations for reasons which are not immediately apparent.

The hill tribe welfare and development programmes as initiated and carried out by the Hill Tribe Division since the late 1950's have comprised four major operational projects, namely: (4)

(i) The Tribal Welfare Settlements project in which the tribesmen are persuaded to settle permanently on officially selected sites. On these sites welfare services and small development projects are provided for them;
(ii) The Development and Welfare Operation Centres which are located in provinces where there are concentrations of hill tribes and which provide welfare services to the tribal settlement through the activities of "mobile development units";
(iii) The Tribal Research Centre which is responsible for the studies and documentation of social, economic and anthropological facts of the six major hill tribes; and
(iv) The Hill Tribe Relations Programme which attempts to create a better relationship between the tribal communities and Thai society generally by sending Buddhist missionaries to the tribal settlements and by arranging "study-tours" of Bangkok and other major Thai cities by tribal leaders.

All of these programmes are directly controlled in terms of policy, management and budgetary support from the Hill Tribe Division in Bangkok with insufficient participation of local administrative authorities or other central government departments. The described operational projects and their method of administration **(Figure 1. See Page 25)** can thus be considered as the manifestations of the "non-integration" philosophy. Being centralized the organization of these projects lacks "....the flexibility to meet unexpected urgent local needs or to promote new ideas as they arise....". (3) Also the management of the projects has to rely largely on periodic directives and reports to and from the outlying operational posts because of the lack of an efficient communication system. Thus the projects are deprived of the flexibility and prompt responses which are so vital to any programmes concerned with human development. I feel some attention must be paid to the characteristics common to all the operational projects thus described.

The first characteristic is what I believe is the over-emphasis on the socio-anthropological studies and documentation of the existing practices of each separate tribe before the introduction of any activity into the tribal villages. I do not doubt that such studies and documentation have value; I do, however, feel that the

FIGURE 1

A SUMMARY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF OPERATIONAL PROJECTS OF THE HILL TRIBE WELFARE DIVISION



time spent on these activities could unwittingly, be delaying urgent development.

The second important charactistic of the division's programmes is the faithful adherence to the "non-integration" philosophy. Repeated attempts have been made to bring welfare and development to the remote and widely scattered tribal settlements, even if field experiences have shown that such effort on the scale committed hardly produces any significant changes, and that any programme which can effectively develop the hill tribes in their "natural habitats" would require resources far exceeding the economic and technical capability of the nation.

The third characteristic of the earlier programmes is the total dismissal of the human ability to adapt and accommodate to new environmental conditions, physical, psychological or social. This characteristic can be clearly seen in the statements to the effect that the hill tribes cannot live comfortably in lowland (5) and that different tribes must be kept apart lest there should be social conflicts which may lead to tribal unrest. I cannot accept the basis of such beliefs which are leading to the maintainance of the **status quo** of tribal conditions. I do not, however, doubt the sincerity of all those engaged in carrying through these **"status quo programmes"**. We just have different opinions on the best way of helping the hill tribes peoples.

The programmes for the welfare and development or the hill tribes since the early 1960's have been carried out largely as an academic exercise with the emphases on the welfare activities and the **in situ** development projects, the main objectives of which seem to be the maintainance of the **status quo** of the relationship between the tribal communities and Thai society generally.

I think most Thais accept the need for foreign specialists and advisers in all fields of our development. But I think I have already made it clear from my earlier observations that we should not accept advice from any quarter without subjecting it to thorough scrutiny. For example, with regard to the question of the hill tribes problem we should ask ourselves whether the specialist has sufficient understanding of the complexity of Thai society and Thai administrative machinery in order to reach reasoned judgments on tribal matters. Thus the recommendations of specialists with regard to the relationships between the ethnic minorities and the Thai society and the ways to alter the relationships to suit the national interests of Thailand must be accepted with caution, no matter how sincere or objective are those recommendations. Some specialists have shown little concern over the urgency of quickly carrying out tribal programmes because they are committed to the philosophy of "non-integration".

There are many in Thailand who would no doubt quarrel with my view that the violent expressions of the misguided malcontented minorities which erupted in December, 1967, were the direct result of the lack of urgency attached to welfare-development programmes and the continued existence of the "non-integrated" policies being pursued.

In 1967 some of the aggressive tribes along the northern border provinces took up arms and joined force with Communist insurgents in open terrorism against the Government of Thailand. This followed the efforts of the insurgents to quietly infiltrate the tribes and use their social and economic discontentment to recruit the tribesmen into subversive activities. Thus by 1968 the spread and intensity of insurgency among hill tribes in northern Thailand had exposed the inadequacies of the "non-integration" philosophy and of the tribal welfare and development programmes. The insurgents also created a large number of hill tribe refugees, in several provinces of northern Thailand. Under such confusing and tragic conditions Ban Pa Klang village was born.

THE REHABILITATION OF HILL TRIBE REFUGEES AT BAN PA KLANG

The attacks on the government posts in Nan Province by hill tribesmen in December, 1967, caught the administration and the security forces ill prepared. The fighting that ensued between the terrorists and the security forces in the Districts of Thung Chang, Chiang Klang and Pua (see map — page 27) was sharp and widespread. In January, 1968, about 900 Meo and Yao tribesmen from several villages in the fighting areas came down from their mountain settlements to seek refuge in the lowland. The number of the refugees increased

NORTHERN THAILAND
MAE SAI
CHIANG KHONG
CHIANG SAEN
MAE CHAN
CHIANG RAI
FANG
MAE SUAI
THOENG
PHAN
CHIANG KHAM
CHIANG KLANG
CHIANG DAO
WIENG PA PAO
MAE CHAI
CHUN
PHRAO
PHAYAO
MAE HONG SON
PAI
WANG NUA
PONG
DOK KAMTAI
MAE TAENG
DOI SAKET
MAERIM
SAMOENG
SANSAI
CHIANG MAI
MAE JARIM
KHUN YUAM
SANKAMPHAENG
NAN
HANG DONG
SARAPHI
CHAE HOM
NGAO
SAN PA TONG
LAMPHUN
PA SANG
MAETHA
SONG
SA
MAE CHAEM
CHOMTHONG
HANG CHAT
RONG KWANG
NA NOI
BAN HONG
PHRAE
PHAKTHA
MAE SARIANG
KO KHA
MAE THA
SUNG MEN
LONG
MOT
SOP PRAP
WANG CHIN
THA PLA
NAM PAT
LI
LAP LAE
OM KOI
UTTRADIT
THOEN
SI SATCHANALAI
LOEI
MAE PHRIK
TRON
SAWAN KALOK
THUNG SALIM
PHICHAI
THA SONG YANG
DAN SAI
SAM NGAO
SI SAMRONG
NAKHON THAI
BANDAN LANHOI
PROM PIRAM
WAT BOT
SUKHOTHAI
LOM KAO
BAN TAK
KONG KRAILAT
MAE RAMAT
TAK
KHIRI MAT
PHITSANULOK
WANG THONG
LOM SAK
MAE SOT
PHRAN KRATAI
SANG RAKAM
BANG KRATHUM
PHETCHABUN
SAMNGAM
KAMPHAENG PHET
PHICHIT
TAPHAN HIN
KHLONG KHLUNG
PHOTHALE
CHON DAEN
UM PHANG
KHANUWORALAK BURI
BANG MUN NAK
NONG PHAI
CHAIYAPHUM
NAKHON SAWAN
WICHIAN BURI
KORAT
UTHAI THANI
CHAINAT
LOP BURI
BURMA
LAOS
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
MALAYSIA
ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS
PROVINCE - "CHANGWAT"
DISTRICT - "AMPUR"
AREA OF ARMED CONFLICTS

sharply to about 2,700 by June, 1968. (Table 1.)

TABLE 1

The number of Refugees at Ban Pa Klang Village 1968 — 1972*

Date	Number of refugees
1968 January	896
June	2,735
1969 January	3,303
June	3,308
1970 January**	2,886
June	2,909
1971 January	2,909
June	3,115
1972 January	4,071
June	4,412

*Four ethnic groups: Northern Thais, Mong, Yao and T'in.
**Personal conflicts among some village leaders resulted in several family groups returning to their villages of origin.
Source: Ban Pa Klang Refugee Village, District of Pua, Nan Province.

These refugees were given temporary living quarters using the available buildings, such as schools or market buildings in the locations. Food, clothes and medical services were also given to the refugees. Much hardship and confusion prevailed during those early months because the officials were not prepared and the relief measures were hastily organized.

No thought had been given to relocating the refugees in more permanent settlements for two reasons because —

(i) The security forces, having underestimated the situation, were confident of clearing the mountains of insurgents within a few months; and
(ii) The philosophy that the hill tribes could not live on the lowland still prevailed with the officials concerned. However soon afterwards the government realized that the armed conflicts would last much longer than had at first been anticipated, and that there was a need to settle the refugees, at least temporarily, in less crowded localities.

A vacant tract of land of about 4,000 acres at Ban Pa Klang (altitude — 300 metres) was chosen to accommodate the large number of refugees. And the "Reception Centre" concept was put into operation. Under this concept, refugees were temporarily relocated on a chosen site pending return to their former settlements. At this stage the "non-integration" philosophy and its associated practical measures still predominated the thoughts of all concerned.

The Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) which controlled all operations, civil as well as military in the area, gave the Hill Tribe Division the task of providing welfare and rehabilitation measures to the refugees. However, it soon became obvious that the organization, administrative capability and leadership quality among the personnel of the Hill Tribe Division needed to be more effective and immediately responsive to meet the demands of refugee rehabilitation activities. About a million baht (US$50,000) was provided by CSOC for the Division to improve the refugees' living conditions, but six months later CSOC decided to take direct operational control of refugee rehabilitation in mid-1968, by setting up the Hill Tribes Affairs Centre within CSOC and appointing two project officers who were empowered to take decisive action in the field.

Right from the beginning the CSOC officers recognized the shortcomings of limiting operational projects for the hill tribes under a single agency. Responsibility for refugee rehabilitation was transferred to the Governor of the province who also acted as the Commander of the provincial CSOC headquarters. The transfer was an administratively significant move because the Governor's Office has always been the co-ordinating point for all the services of the provincial offices of all the Government Departments. Thus it was the first time that an official hill tribe programme had effectively become a multi-agency operation (Figure 2. See Page 29). Nevertheless, the refugee rehabilitation efforts of the first year still adhered to the "non-integration" philosophy and the programme was limited to welfare-reflief measures pending the return of the tribesmen to their former settlements.

The impetus of the rehabilitation of refugees at Ban Pa Klang in the first year was derived from the efforts of the CSOC project officers who were "new hands" in hill tribe affairs and who began their task with no preconceived

FIGURE 2

THE ADMINISTRATION OF REFUGEE SETTLEMENTS



ideas. Their immediate task was simply to prevent a deteriorating situation from deteriorating even further. The officers were so occupied by the organization and administration of keeping the refugees adequately supplied with food, clothing, shelter and medical care that they resorted to a "rule of thumb" and commonsense rather than any sophisticated theoretical ideas and arguments. As for the tribesmen, their early hardships led to a lowering of any traditional or cultural barriers that they might have had against the lowland Thais and the Thai officials. Thus at Ban Pa Klang, the hill-tribesmen and the Thai officials established a close and regular contact of a new kind.

Red tape was minimised in order to get things done for the refugees and the two project officers were vested with sufficient authority from CSOC to take independent decisive actions as the on-the-spot situation required. Thus a new pattern of activities towards the hill tribes of Thailand emerged in which high-calibre senior officials from the central government were assigned to take responsibility in the field and to act as co-ordinators for the actions of local agencies. They were aided by efficient communications and fairly efficient logistics.

The process through which the CSOC officers adopted the "accelerated integration" philosophy was a gradual one. The philosophy was brought about by field observations and other realisations. The most important contributing factors were:

(a) The observations that the hill tribe refugees adapted remarkably well to their new physical and social environments;
(b) The realization that so long as the hill tribes remain the ethnic minorities in Thailand they are exposed to political and military exploitation by the Communist insurgents and thus remain a constant security threat to the country;
(c) The realization that so long as the hill tribes are not recognized as Thai citizens they are deprived of nearly all the nation's major resources and services which are necessary to give them a reasonably decent standard of living;
(d) The desire, either expressed or indicated over the period of time, of the majority of the hill tribe refugees to enjoy the benefits of being in the mainstream of the modern socio-economic framework;
(e) The realization that the remote areas inhabited by the hill tribes will eventually be reached by various development projects (such as the Mekong Development Project) and the hill tribes will therefore eventually be exposed to the pressures of modern life; and
(f) There is no justifiable reason to arrest the development of the tribal groups.

Once the "accelerated integration" philosophy had been adopted a systematic concept for refugee rehabilitation and integration was formulated (**Figure 3. See Page 31**). Under this concept, once the refugees arrive at the temporary living quarters, they are relocated to a reception centre as quickly as possible to reduce unnecessary hardship and suffering. At these quarters and reception centres the refugees are provided with their essential needs. Then they are given permanent homestead and farm plots in a refugee village. They are also supplied with building materials, tools, seeds and fertilizers. In the refugee village, the tribesmen are assisted to become self-sufficient in food production and to earn cash incomes. They are also treated as full Thai citizens, being given ownership of their plots and provided with those standard welfare, educational, agricultural and medical service enjoyed by all lowland Thais. The refugee village is declared a normal Thai village and is under the jurisdiction of the local administration. Social and occupational contacts between the different tribes and between the tribesmen and lowland Thais are encouraged.

This concept has been put into practice at Ban Pa Klang since early 1969. The village now accommodates four different ethnic groups—northern Thais, Mong, Yao and T'in—numbering 4,412 (**Table 1.**). Close observation of the progress shown by the refugees indicates that the path of changes of the refugees consists of four different phases — the arrival phase, the phase of maximum conflicts, the adaptation phase and the phase of successful adaptation (**Table 2. See**

FIGURE 3

CSOC'S REFUGEE REHABILITATION PROCEDURES


DEVELOPMENT CARRIED OUT BY THE UNITS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE AND THE BORDER PATROL POLICE.
FORMER HILLTRIBE VILLAGES
TEMPORARY LIVING QUARTERS
ENTERING RECEPTION CENTRE
RECEPTION CENTRE
ENTERING REFUGEE CENTRE
REHABILITATION ACTIVIES BY PROVINCIAL CSOC HEADQUARTERS, RECEIVING SUPPORT FROM CSOC HILLTRIBE PROJECT CENTRE.
REFUGEE VILLAGE
TRANSFORMATION TO NORMAL THAI VILLAGE
FURTHER DEVELOPMENT BY THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION AND OTHER NORMAL AGENCIES.
NORMAL THAI VILLAGE

TABLE 2

THE PATH OF DEVELOPMENT OF REFUGEES UNDER CSOC REHABILITATION — PROCEDURES

PHYSICAL MOVEMENTS		FORMER SETTLEMENTS → TEMPORARY RECEPTION POINT	RECEPTION CENTRES	RESETTLEMENT CENTRES	NORMAL THAI VILLAGE
STAGES OF REHABILITATION		ARRIVAL	CONFLICTS	ADAPTATION	SUCCESSFUL ADAPTATION
FACTORS AFFECTING BEHAVIOURS	PSYCHOLOGICAL	- Demoralized through the actions of the terrorists. - Grieves over loss of land, home and properties. - Suspicious of officials. - Some have unhappy past experience with officials or lowlanders. - Worries over problems of food and family's welfare. - Uncertainty of future. - Loyalty to group. - Old belief in opium and shifting cultivation.	- Tales of previous settlements which had failed. - Rising expectations created by relief measures and contacts with officials etc. - Inferiority complex toward new social environment. - Bitterness against exploitation or neglects by bad officials (if any) and/or merchants and lowlanders. - Mistrust of modern technology, crops and livestock.	- Developing "refugees' complex". - Increasing faith in (good) officials. - Increasing self confidence. - New family pride. - Increasing faith in the superiority of new technology, crops and livestock (which had been successfully demonstrated).	- Active participation in community affairs. - Some form of cooperation among the settlers. - Willingness to commit monetary resources to self development.
	PHYSICAL	- Minimum personal belongings. - Little or no seeds, livestock and tools. - Little or no food reserves. - Crowded living quarters. - Crowded farm land.	- Materials disparities between families or family groups become sharp - Uncertainty over foods. - Interaction between families and/or family groups.	- Understanding and acceptance of causes of materials disparities. - Food supply assured. - Own home and land; better hygiene.	- Investments for family's comfort. - Food supply assured plus cash income. - Permanent home.
	ENVIRONMENTAL	- Relatively poorer climate compared with upland. - May be on poorer land and water. - Difficult ground to work; weed problem etc. - Different crops, usually lower in value and more difficult marketing than the traditional crop.	- Possibility of epidemic. - Relatively harsher agricultural conditions which require more work and capital inputs.	- Acquired increasing ability to use new technology and capital input.	- Higher degree of technological competence to cope with the unfamiliar problems of the new environments.

Page 32). The behaviour and reaction of the refugees at each phase are the result of the interplay of three groups of factors — the psychological, the physical and the environmental factor.

CSOC recognizes that the most critical phase in the whole process is the phase of "maximum conflicts". All efforts must be directed at identifying the sources of conflict between the different groups of refugees and eliminating these sources as quickly as possible. It is essential that government officials keep a constant watch on these factors and their changes so that timely and appropriate measures can be carried out to reduce the effect of negative factors and to enhance the benefits of the positive ones.

WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AT BAN PA KLANG?

Within four years the programme has turned about 4,500 refugees who arrived demoralised and dispossessed into self-sufficient and stable families capable of further social and economic development. The project has established a stable and mixed tribal community provided with public facilities and services comparable to those of a "developed" Thai village. These are the direct results of the programme. However, the indirect results are more interesting and will have a far reaching effects on all hill tribe development in Thailand. These results are:

(a) The demonstration of the success of the "accelerated integration" philosophy to the Thai Administration. Now at Ban Pa Klang about 4,500 hill tribesmen of four different ethnic groups are living happily together. The children of the different tribes attend the same school and the Thai language is being used as the common language for communication in both official and intertribal business.

(b) The demonstration of the benefits of a well-planned government programme to the hill tribes. At Ban Pa Klang the tribesmen have learnt by experience that there is much to be gained from a government programme. They have learnt that by adopting the new agricultural practices, advocated by the government officials, they can successfully crop the land repeatedly without resorting to shifting cultivation. They have experienced the social benefits offered by a developed community, they have seen that opportunities are offered, through education, for their children to achieve better lives in the mainstream of the nation. The tribesmen are beginning to take these new experiences less consciously — an indication that they feel assured that the success of Ban Pa Klang is not artificial or temporary. The success at Ban Pa Klang is a step towards bridging the credibility gap between the minority groups and the main society;

(c) The establishment of an administrative pattern which allows a multi-agency approach to hill tribe problems. The success at Ban Pa Klang is the result of the efforts of several agencies; such co-ordinated effort is rare in Thai Government services and is unprecedented in the hill tribe programmes. In the past, the failure of hill tribe programmes has been attributed to the limitations of the single responsible agency; the recommended remedy has been to raise the status of the agency. (6) The experience at Ban Pa Klang has shown that this type of remedial action never had any chance of success. The Ban Pa Klang lesson demonstrates that hill tribes development requires a well-co-ordinated multi-agency approach;

(d) Evidence has been produced showing the need to review the existing government philosophy and policy toward the hill tribes. The hill tribesmen of Ban Pa Klang have demonstrated that it is possible for the mountain people to rapidly adapt to their new lowland home. Therefore this must cast serious doubts on the validity of the "no-integration" or "open-ended

integration" philosophy and its corollary policies and programmes, both in Thailand and in other countries. The experience at Ban Pa Klang strongly indicates that a pragmatic approach to tribal problems produces sound results, and

(e) There is ample evidence that tribal cultures and traditions remain largely intact even when the tribesmen are physically, socially and economically integrated into Thai society. The pursuance of an "accelerated integration" policy is deliberately confined to the social, economic and political areas. Cultural and religious matters are left to the choice of the tribesmen. In fact, the CSOC officials concerned encourage the tribesmen to maintain their cultural and religious heritage. Therefore there is no basis for the fear of those who predict the disappearance of tribal cultures as the tribes are integrated.

THE APPLICABILITY OF THE LESSONS OF BAN PA KLANG

Can the experiences obtained and lessons learnt at Ban Pa Klang be successfully applied to the development and integration of the hill tribes in their normal settlements? I believe the answer must be affirmatively in the positive. Firstly the "accelerated integration" philosophy as being carried out at Ban Pa Klang creates a positive attitude among those Thai officials concerned with hill tribe affairs. They develop a compassion — a compassion which I must admit is not always there to start with — for our less privileged Thai citizens. The old attitude of "non-integration" does not instil the right frame of mind for government officials to start off their work among the tribesmen. The new policy brings out the best human qualities in our officials and gives them a positive approach which is so vital to the development and fulfilment of a successful hill tribes programme.

Secondly, the co-ordination demonstrated at Ban Pa Klang will increase the efficiency of all hill tribe programmes by allowing unlimited room for participation by other government agencies. The administrative barriers surrounding previous hill tribe programmes and which caused muct inefficiency would be removed once the multi-agency concept is put into practice. Thus greater national resources would become available to the hill tribes programmes.

Thirdly, under the "accelerated integration" philosophy, government workers would pay more attention to the resolution of human conflict than they would have done under the old philosophy of "non-integration". In the past, too much time and money has been spent on the study of tribal conflict and little has been given to resolve the actual conflict with its attendant suffering. The Ban Pa Klang system would reverse this illogical distribution of resources and effort.

The Ban Pa Klang experience has shown that with the right government officials given on-the-spot authority and co-ordinated support, the difficult task of hill tribe development can be accomplished in a relatively short time. However, it should be emphasised that the factors contributing to the success of Ban Pa Klang do not require that all hill tribes people must necessarily be brought down to the lowlands in order to enjoy the advantages of an integrated and developed village society. It it just as feasible to create "Ban Pa Klangs" in the mountains.

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RSVP--Volunteers for Rural Uplift

In the Philippines there is a silent front where a campaign against poverty, ignorance, disease and disenchantment is being waged. Youthful volunteers are conducting this campaign, chiefly from the Rural Service Volunteers of the Philippines, Inc. (RSVP), of which the author of this article is Co-Chairman. Their work to date may not have been substantial, but it is significant enough in that it has served as a model for both the private and government sectors in the continuing effort to alleviate discontent and check dissidence.

By Ben Javier

LAST January, in Bangkok, a delegation from the Philippines called on the then Secretary-General of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization, Gen. Jesus Vargas, at SEATO Headquarters. The talk was on volunteerism as a force for progress among Southeast Asians. Volunteerism, said the General, is a force for good. It is dynamic and, when well directed, fruitful and effective. More and more sectors should harness volunteerism in solving many of the ills that beset people in the process of changing to a better life.

Without knowing it, the SEATO chief had touched on the theme of the conference that the delegation from the Philippines was then attending. It was a regional meet on volunteerism and youth sponsored jointly by the International Secretariat for Volunteer Services (ISVS) and the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). ECAFE Executive U Nyun had just addressed the conference. He stressed the need for common and continuing efforts to promote the economic goals of Asian countries. Volunteer work, he said, is one such effort and should be encouraged.

A number of volunteer groups were represented in the Philippine delegation. One of them was Operation Brotherhood which sends out what is known as "export" volunteers. Another was the Rural Service Volunteers of the Philippines, Inc. (RSVP), represented by its officials, Mr. Robert Price, Jr.,Chairman, and myself as Co-Chairman.

Price — a Filipino despite his foreign-sounding name — had told the week-long conference that RSVP was one of the biggest volunteer organisations in Asia. RSVP counts with some 10,000 alumni members, men and women who have served in numberless projects during its six-year existence. He said the organization was continuing to grow, this time as a private, non-sectarian, non-political and non-profit foundation. At the conference I unveiled plans for eventually sending out RSVP volunteers to other South-East Asian countries, starting with members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). These "export" volunteers would be either or both rural development and medical teams — the two categories of RSVP volunteers.

Six years back, when RSVP first made its appearance, it was as an adjunct of army civic action. President Marcos, as commander-in-chief of the country's armed forces, had approved a meaningful civic action programme. Its primary purpose was to contain and discourage dissidence. Its chief area of operation was Central Luzon, the highly tenanted central plains where the Communist-led Huks held sway.

The President leaned heavily on a civic action blueprint prepared by the then Defense Secretary Ernesto Mata and his erudite Under Secretary, Manuel Syquio. The blueprint envisaged a civilian to get students and the youth into civic action work under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). All

three agreed that Price, Jr., was the man for the job. Price immediately set into motion an intensive recruitment and training programme. Starting off with students taking their summer vacation, he had them train at several Civic Action Centres operated by the various armed services in Luzon, the Visayas and Mindanao.

A principal area of fielding was, of course, Central Luzon, chiefly the province of Pampanga, stamping ground of the rampaging Huks. Here the rural villagers in the barrios were shown by volunteers the latest methods of producing crops, caring for poultry and swine, and building feeder roads and irrigation dams on a do-it-yourself basis. Price coined the name RSVP — meaning Rural Service Volunteer Program — for his portion of the AFP's civic action work. The armed forces were in the picture only during the process of recruitment and training. They kept to the background when the volunteers were fielded for stints of one month.

Response to the RSVP undertaking was enthusiastic from the start. Hundreds of students from nearly all college disciplines flocked to the recruiting offices set up by Price at Camp Aguinaldo, the AFP headquarters outside Manila. The number of applicants eventually became such that RSVP authorities had to limit recruitment only to junior and senior college students. The reasoning was that these were better able to impart their expertise to people in the hinterlands. I was covering the army beat for the **EXAMINER** Magazine when I was "recruited" into the volunteer programme right at the outset. I was to be in charge of information and helped in blueprinting a training and fielding programme. Other civilians were likewise invited to help out. Civic action was acquiring a more palatable taste. AFP brass were discreet. They allowed the civilians full leeway in fashioning the programme and implementing its planks.

The RSVP operational set-up was simple enough. Critical areas — those plagued by dissidence and threatened by insecurity due to discontent and poverty — were designated by the AFP for intensified civic action work. Army engineers bulldozed areas earmarked for feeder roads. Army surgeons and medical units were dispatched to the barrios. Civic action teams worked among the rural population. RSVP volunteers then followed in their wake. They were taken to the critical areas by airforce planes and navy ships. On land the volunteers were ferried aboard army and Philippine Constabulary vehicles. Agricultural equipment and medical supplies were made available to the volunteers. The tempo of civic action was stepped up. Its "civilian face" proved effective, the authorities soon found out.

The programme could have become too effective for comfort, though. After three years of operation, there were heard carping remarks about its being used as an administration ploy to win support in the elections. Some opposition Liberals attacked the RSVP in their campaign speeches. A good programme could be ruined by political bickerings. It was clear RSVP had to go. Either this or it had to dissociate itself from its army supporters.

It was a hard decision to make. The plunge was taken early in 1971, after a year of enforced inactivity to weather out criticisms of the programme. The original civilian component of RSVP decided to incorporate the programme and set up a purely private volunteer foundation.

A working Board of Trustees was formed with the original civilian framers of the programme making up the board. The council now has, among others, Banker Pio Pedrosa, Financier Antonio Roxas Chua, Public Relations Specialist Jose Carpio, Prince of the Church Julio Cardinal Rosales, Lay Leader Leon O. Ty, Publisher D. H. Soriano, Constitutional Convention Delegate Carmencita O. Reyes, and former Senator Geronima T. Pecson. From the government sector come Agrarian Reform Secretary Conrado F. Estrella, Agricultural Productivity Commissioner Francisco Saguiguit and Internal Revenue Deputy Commissioner Conrado Diaz. Senator Ernesto Maceda, former chief of the Presidential Arm for Community Development (PACD), is also on the council. Medical adviser of RSVP is Dr. Buenaventura Angtuaco, twice president of the Philippine Medical Association, and longtime dean of the medical college of the University of Santo Tomas.

Under its new set-up, RSVP has further expanded its activities. This time the bulk of the organization's funding comes from private donors. The government is, of course, still helping out, chiefly with facilities and expert personnel during periodic training sessions for the volunteers. A principal source of funds is the

PBSP — the Philippine Business for Social Progress. This organization of leading Philippine business firms helps finance worthwhile undertakings aimed at promoting the welfare of the under-privileged, especially the pockets of poverty in the country.

RSVP volunteers have trekked to some of the most inaccessible frontiers of the Philippines. Lately volunteer medical teams have been sent in relays to the country's southernmost island, Cagayan de Sulu, close to Sabah. A number of teams, both medical and rural development, also helped rehabilitate the lives of barrios in the provinces of Zamboanga, Misamis Occidental, Agusan del Sur, Cebu and the Samar-Leyte area. Volunteer teams fielded in the typhoon-ravaged towns of Samar and Leyte earlier this year won praise from government officials and private sector representatives for selfless and dedicated service. Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, the First Lady, and Social Welfare Secretary Dr. Estefanis Aldaba Lim, gave the volunteers full credit for their unstinted services.

Blueprints are now being studied for a series of RSVP rural hospitals. These are to be set up in places inaccessible to doctors and medical units. The first such hospital, of 20-beds, is to be constructed in a Zamboanga barrio. The second is now being arranged for in a barrio in Salcedo, a remote town on the Pacific coast of Samar.

Shortly after its reorganization, RSVP signed memorandum agreements with two rural-oriented organizations: the Philippine Family Planning Agency, Inc. (PFPA) and the Agriculture and Rural Broadcasters Organization, Inc. (ARBOR).

With the PFPA, RSVP has embarked on a programme to introduce family planning on a mass scale into the hinterland areas not currently reached by any family planning group. Both medical and development workers attached to RSVP are given a crash course in family planning motivational and informational techniques. The stress is on population limitation as resulting on less mouths to feed. The message is not lost on highly impoverished areas where RSVP volunteers are invariably fielded. Said Mrs. Jo Villarba, PFPA chairman and executive director: "Our family planners have not penetrated into the really rural areas, where their services are vitally needed. The reason is obvious: they have their hands full as it is, servicing our big towns and their peripheries. But we cannot wait years before bringing family planning into the neglected areas. We have to do this now, even with the limited facilities we have.

"Volunteer work is the answer. Especially volunteer work as exemplified by RSVP. Our tie-up with RSVP has resulted in realizing our hopes for a really meaningful family planning programme for the rural areas."

ARBOR is an organization of farm broadcasters throughout the country. Its members are the most listened to in the local broadcasting industry. They are on the air in the early mornings, at noon and early in the evenings. They get the message of rural service across. With its tie-up with RSVP, ARBOR has increased its effectiveness. Rural folk are adequately informed of the projects undertaken by RSVP volunteers. They may also rely on ARBOR feedback to acquaint RSVP with local problems necessitating volunteer assistance.

RSVP works through provincial and municipal RSVP councils. These councils are usually made up of influential citizens of the provinces and towns served. They work out plans and projects requiring RSVP assistance. These then are transmitted to Manila where the trustees of RSVP rate them by priorities. The more impoverished and out of the way a community is, the higher on the priority scale its requirements are. Volunteers are paid a daily honorarium of two pesos each. Medical team members get slightly higher allowances. Volunteers are also provided transportation to and from their places of assignment, chiefly aboard commercial planes and infrequently by Philippine Air Force aircraft or Philippine Navy boats. In addition, all volunteers are given free insurance during their period of service.

Provincial and municipal councils, for their part, come up with foster parents for the volunteers with whom the latter stay during their period of service. In many cases, this work is actually undertaken by barrio RSVP councils. Usually it is the barrio captain, a duly elected official, who heads a council.

What is the secret of the comparative success of RSVP operations? This has been asked time and again. In fact, there is no secret. There is just a comparatively high degree of cooperation between volunteers and RSVP officials on the one hand and between volunteers and their rural hosts, on the other. A thoroughly rigid screening process, involving psychiatric tests, accounts for the consistently high quality of volunteer corps fielded by RSVP. There is also a frequent on-the-spot check of field workers conducted personally by either the RSVP Chairman, the Co-Chairman or other officials of the organization.

"We make every RSVP volunteer feel he is needed by the community he serves," says Price. "We also make him feel that he can learn from the barrio folk as much, if not more, than he can possibly teach them. He makes himself useful that way."

How about the problem of dissidence in RSVP-served areas? Price is explicit on this. "We used to be known as part of army civic action. We were supposed to counter the activities of Huk recruiters and build a better image for the armed forces. Now, as a completely civilian entity divorced from the army, we have lost that identity. But one cannot dispute the fact that RSVP has continued to function as an anti-dissident organization. Maybe not directly but as a side effect of our efforts to ameliorate living conditions in the hinterlands. Dissidence thrives on discontent. Remove that and you make the ground barren for the seeds of subversion. We are glad that in our own little way, we are contributing to the cause of peaceful livelihood in the country."

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